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nal Law.2 52 Indeed, imposition of such a requirement is particularly
inappropriate at a time when the number of alcohol-related traffic
accidents is increasing dramatically.23
Robert J. Gunther, Jr.
No cause of action may be maintained by a nonpatient kidney
donor under the rescue doctrine
It is well established that one who is injured while attempting
to rescue another may recover from the tortfeasor whose original
negligence precipitated the need for the rescue.254 An independent
'12 See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J.
1074, 1078 & n.37 (1979) (discussing the exigency involved in testing for BAC); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 1970) (prescribing a 2-hour time limit for the taking of
blood samples to determine BAC).
253 See supra note 203.
2 See generally Tiley, The Rescue Principle, 30 MOD. L. REV. 25, 25 (1967); Note,
Torts: Proximate Cause: Rescue Doctrine, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 476, 476-81 (1950). A rescue is
considered to be a normal, intervening action which does not break the original chain of
causation, regardless of whether the actual rescue was foreseeable. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 276-77 (4th ed. 1971). Indeed, "[t]he right of one person to
render another assistance, when the latter is in danger from any cause, under conditions
rendering it safe to do so, is as clear as his right to perform any other lawful act." Bond v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 82 W. Va. 557, 561, 96 S.E. 932, 934 (1918); cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 294 comment a (1965) (one who creates "an unreasonable risk of harm" to a
person may be liable to that person's rescuer).
The first New York case considering the rescue doctrine was Eckert v. Long Island
R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), in which the Court of Appeals stated that negligence will not be
imputed to one who attempts to preserve human life, "unless [his act was done] under such
circumstances as to constitute rashness ...... Id. at 506. In a similar vein, Judge Cardozo,
in the oft-quoted language of Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437
(1921), observed:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law
does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences.
It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural
and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is
a wrong also to his rescuer .... The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is
born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not
have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.
Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437-38 (citation omitted).
The rescue doctrine has been recognized in virtually all jurisdictions. See, e.g., Barger
v. Charles Mach. Works, Inc., 658 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1981); Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 6 Cal. 3d 361, 368, 491 P.2d 821, 824-25, 99 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-33 (1971); Walker Hauling
Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 624, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1964); Seibutis v. Smith, 83 InI.
App. 3d 1010, 1015-16, 404 N.E.2d 950, 954 (1980); Brock v. Peabody Coop. Equity Exch.,
186 Kan. 657, 659-60, 352 P.2d 37, 40 (1960); Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 450, 70 N.W.2d
805, 808 (1955); McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 432 S.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Mo. 1968);
1983] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
duty of care is owed by the tortfeasor to the rescuer, who is consid-
ered a foreseeable plaintiff, and negligence on the part of the res-
cuer typically does not bar his recovery. 55 New York courts have
applied the rescue doctrine in a variety of situations but, in doing
so, generally have premised its application upon the same underly-
ing elements.256 Recently, in Moore v. Shah, 7 the Appellate Divi-
Drummond v. Mid-West Growers Coop. Corp., 91 Nev. 698, 706, 542 P.2d 198, 204 (1975).
Interestingly, the rescue doctrine was not applied in Canada until 1910, see Seymour v.
Winnepeg Elec. Ry., 13 W.L.R. 566, 571 (1910), and not in England until 1938, see Haynes
v. Harwood, [1934] 2 K.B. 240, 252, afi'd, [1935] 1 K.B. 146. See generally Linden, Rescuers
and Good Samaritans, 34 MoD. L. REv. 241, 252-59 (1971).
20' See W. PROSSER, supra note 254, § 43, at 258. The rescue doctrine most frequently
has been employed to absolve the rescuer from a charge of contributory negligence and thus
to permit him to recover for injuries suffered during the course of the rescue. See, e.g.,
Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 260, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325 (1968);
Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871); Rodriguez v. New York State Thruway
Auth., 82 App. Div. 2d 853, 854, 440 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (2d Dep't 1981); Carney v. Buyea, 271
App. Div. 338, 342, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 907 (4th Dep't 1946); see also F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN
THE LAw OF TORTS 568 n,33 (1926). The shield which the doctrine provides against a charge
of contributory negligence, however, is not impenetrable. See Wagner v. International Ry.,
232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 506
(1871); Prior Aviation Serv., Inc. v. State, 100 Misc. 2d 237, 240, 418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Ct.
CL 1979). Whether a rescuer's behavior was reasonable is normally a jury question. See, e.g.,
Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 229, 135 N.E. 272, 272 (1922); Wag-
ner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921); Rodriguez v. New York
State Thruway Auth., 82 App. Div. 2d 853, 854, 440 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (2d Dep't 1981).
2" Rescue doctrine cases typically involve a situation in which a person has been placed
in "imminent peril" by the negligence of another. E.g., Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 260,
244 N.E.2d 26, 28, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325 (1968). A third person, who voluntarily endangers
himself in order to rescue the victim, then becomes part of the scenario. See id. Continuity
in the chain of causation between the original negligent act and the rescue is not disturbed
"by the exercise of volition." Wagneri.:titernational Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437,
438 (1921). In most instances, the reaction of the rescuer is spontaneous, and occurs imme-
diately after the original negligent act. See, e.g., Gibney v. State, 137 N.Y. 1, 5, 33 N.E. 142,
142 (1893) (father jumped into canal to save drowning son); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43
N.Y. 502, 503-04 (1871) (rescuer pushed child out of path of oncoming train). But see Gua-
rino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 462-63, 255 N.E.2d 173, 174, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942, 943-44 (1969) (defectively manufactured gas mask created subsequent need
for rescue of sewage worker); Rucker v. Andress, 38 App. Div. 2d 684, 685, 327 N.Y.S.2d 91,
92 (4th Dep't 1971) (plaintiff rescued person who was trapped in car for approximately 15
minutes after collision occurred); Prior Aviation Serv., Inc. v. State, 100 Misc. 2d 237, 239,
418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Ct. CL 1979) (helicopter pilot attempted rescue of stranded persons
11 minutes after accident took place).
One New York court extended the rescue doctrine in Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d
782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1960), wherein a father who attempted
to commit suicide was rescued by his son, who himself was injured. Id. at 783, 199 N.Y.S.2d
at 214. That the father's suicide attempt was "not a simple act of negligence," id. at 784, 199
N.Y.S.2d at 215, was not considered dispositive by the Talbert court. Id. The court stated
that a legal duty still was owed by the father to anyone in the area who might try to save
him. Id. Additionally, in Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d
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sion, Third Department, held that the rescue doctrine does not ap-
ply to the voluntary and deliberate donation of a kidney,
undertaken in the absence of emergency pressures.2 58
In Moore, the plaintiff's father suffered kidney failure after an
allegedly negligent medical diagnosis and treatment by the defen-
dant doctor.259 When it became apparent that a kidney transplant
was necessary to alleviate his father's condition, the plaintiff
donated one of his kidneys for the operation. s6 After the success-
ful transplantation, the plaintiff and his parents brought a negli-
gence action against the father's physician.2 1 The son maintained
that as a result of the doctor's negligence, it was foreseeable that
the need for a kidney transplant would arise. 6 The plaintiff fur-
ther argued that he came to the rescue of his father by providing
the needed kidney, and thus, the doctor was responsible to the son
for the physical and mental injuries which he later suffered. 63
Special Term, Chemung County, rejected this contention and
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.26 4
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, af-
firmed.265 Judge Weiss, writirtg for a unanimous court,266 initially
noted that liability to a plaintiff is predicated upon the existence
of a foreseeable duty owed to him by a defendant.267 The court
then stated that although the rescue doctrine may be used to es-
173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969), the rescue doctrine was extended to cover a situation in which
a breach of warranty created a dangerous condition inviting rescue. Id. at 465, 255 N.E.2d at
176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46.
57 90 App. Div. 2d 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (3d Dep't 1982).
211 Id. at 389-90, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
259 Id. at 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
260 Id.
261 Brief for Appellant at 2, Moore v. Shah, 90 App. Div. 2d 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (3d
Dep't 1982).
262 90 App. Div. 2d at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34. The son, Marvin Richard Moore, argued
that as a close relative, he would be the most likely kidney donor. Id. It is generally recog-
nized that family members are the most genetically acceptable donors. See Guttman, Renal
Transplantation, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 975, 975 (1979); Woodside, Organ Transplanta-
tion: The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's Responsibility, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 66, 69-71
(1970).
2 6 90 App. Div. 2d at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34. The plaintiff sought damages for the
physical injuries which he suffered as a result of the kidney donation and surgery. Brief for
Appellant at 3, Moore v. Shah, 90 App. Div. 2d 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (3d Dep't 1982).
1" 90 App. Div. 2d at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
206 Id. at 389-90, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
266 Joining Justice Weiss were Justices Mahoney, Kane, Casey and Mikoll.
26 Id. at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34; see, e.g., Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 403, 135
N.E.2d 708, 709, 153 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (1956).
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tablish this duty, the elements necessary to invoke the doctrine
had not been satisfied.268 Specifically, the court observed that an
emergency evoking an instinctive reaction on the part of the plain-
tiff did not exist, and that the son had donated the kidney some-
time after the allegedly negligent diagnosis and treatment of his
father.26 9 In addition, Justice Weiss relied upon an earlier case, Si-
rianni v. Anna,7 ° which dealt with strikingly similar factual cir-
cumstances,27 1 and stated that although the court was not bound
to follow that decision, the rescue doctrine argument presented in
that case properly was rejected.27 2 The court further reasoned that
several New York cases, in denying recovery to third parties who
suffered psychic injuries as a result of direct injuries to others, pro-
vide additional support for its decision.27 '  Finally, Justice Weiss
reasoned, notwithstanding the existence of an injury, the creation
of a remedy for the plaintiff would be undesirable from a policy
standpoint and increasingly difficult to contain.274
It is submitted that the Moore court's refusal to extend appli-
268 90 App. Div. 2d at 390-91, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34. The court characterized the son's
action as "deliberate and reflective," thereby not entitling him to recover under the rescue
doctrine. Id. at 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33; see supra note 256 and accompanying text.
269 90 App. Div. 2d at 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33. Notwithstanding his reliance upon the
nonemergency nature of the circumstances in Moore, Justice Weiss noted that the rescue
doctrine has been applied, in some cases, when the plaintiff's reaction was not immediate.
See Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 255 N.E.2d 173, 175, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (1969); Rucker v. Andress, 38 App. Div. 2d 684, 685, 327 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92
(4th Dep't 1971); Keith v. Payne, 164 App. Div. 642-43, 150 N.Y.S. 37, 38 (3d Dep't 1914);
supra note 256.
270 55 Misc. 2d 553, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1967).
271 In Sirianni, a mother brought an action against her son's physicians for their alleg-
edly negligent removal of his kidney tissue. Id. at 554, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 710. She had volun-
tarily donated one of her kidneys to save her son. Id. The Sirianni court labelled the
mother's complaint a "brand new cause of action," id. at 555, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712, and
considered her donation to be an "independent, intervening act," id. at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at
712. Significantly, after examining several rescue doctrine cases, the court concluded that a
rescuer acts "without knowing his fate." Id. The court then stated that the voluntary dona-
tion of a kidney is a wanton act, and equated "wanton" with the term "wilful." Id. After
observing that Judge Cardozo, in Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E.
437, 438 (1921), had excluded a wanton act from the coverage of the doctrine, the Sirianni
court ruled that a voluntary, wilful act, such as donating a kidney, fell outside the purview
of the rescue principle. 55 Misc. 2d at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
272 90 App. Div. 2d at 391, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
172 Id. at 391-92, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 35. Judge Weiss specifically cited Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), in which the Court of Appeals
declared that a third party does not possess a cause of action for injuries suffered as a result
of a direct injury to another. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555; see
infra note 283 and accompanying text.
274 90 App. Div. 2d at 392, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
19831
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cation of the rescue doctrine is warranted in light of the past inter-
pretations afforded the doctrine by the New York judiciary. Al-
though the Moore panel's treatment of the rescue doctrine as a
potential theory of liability was somewhat summary,2 7 it nonethe-
less appears that the courts have attempted to keep the rescue
principle within certain well-defined bounds. 278 It is suggested,
however, that the court's effort to negate the doctrine based upon
the voluntariness of the plaintiff-donor's act is misplaced, since
voluntary conduct on the part of the rescuer traditionally has not
precluded application of the doctrine. Rather, it seems that the
nonpatient donor's claim fails under the rescue principle because
his act was not part of the single continuous occurrence beginning
with the defendant's negligence and culminating in the rescuer's
injury.27 8 Though variations in the time differential between the
effect of the original negligence and the rescue have not rendered
the doctrine inapplicable, 279 in each of these instances there was a
:75 Id. at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
276 See Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 229, 135 N.E. 272, 272
(1922); Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 340, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (4th Dep't 1946); cf.
Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 784, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady
County 1960) (father attempting suicide owed duty to potential rescuers); supra note 256
and accompanying text. In Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255
N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969), the Court, while extending the rescue doctrine to
cover a breach of warranty on the part of the defendant, id. at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306
N.Y.S.2d at 945-46, required that each of the other elements of the doctrine be established,
id., 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46. In Lafferty v. Manhasset Med. Center Hosp.,
54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981), the Court recognized that the
rescue doctrine never had been used to allow recovery for psychic injury. Id. at 279, 429
N.E.2d at 790, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
277 Although the Sirianni court emphasized that a "rescuer act[s] without knowing his
fate," 55 Misc. 2d at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712, other rescue cases dispute this interpretation.
The Court of Appeals itself has stated that "[t]he law does not discriminate between the
rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost." Wagner v. International Ry., 232
N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921); see Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 506
(1871); Bond v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 82 W. Va. 557, 560, 96 S.E. 932, 933 (1918); see also
Tiley, supra note 254, at 25.
278 See Gibney v. State, 137 N.Y. 1, 6, 33 N.E. 141, 142 (1893); see also Wagner v.
International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921). In Wagner, the Court inti-
mated that "peril and rescue must be in substance one transaction; ... there must be un-
broken continuity between the commission of the wrong and the effort to avert its conse-
quences." Id.; see Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 466, 255 N.E.2d
173, 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 946 (1969); Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 244 N.E.2d 26,
28-29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 326 (1968); see also Barger v. Charles Mach. Works, Inc., 658 F.2d
582, 587 (8th Cir. 1981); Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 447-48, 70 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1955).
27 See, e.g., Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 462-63, 255 N.E.2d
173, 174-75, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943-44 (1969); Rucker v. Andress, 38 App. Div. 2d 684, 685,
327 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (4th Dep't 1971); Prior Aviation Serv., Inc. v. State, 100 Misc. 2d 237,
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direct causal connection between the initial negligence and the res-
cuer's action, even if slightly removed in time.80 In Moore, it ap-
pears that this connection was broken by the plaintiff's subsequent
and presumably informed decision to donate one of his kidneys.28 1
In addition, it is submitted that the court's reliance upon ear-
lier decisions which declined to allow bystander recovery for emo-
tional distress was somewhat inappropriate since, in Moore, the
plaintiff sought recovery for both physical and psychic injuries.2 82
Those cases do serve, however, to illustrate the New York courts'
desire to limit the extent of liability in negligence actions gener-
ally, and in "third-party" suits especially. 83 A nonpatient donor,
239, 418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
280 In Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969), the malfunctioning of a defective gas mask, manufactured at some
earlier point, necessitated the rescue of a sewage worker in a sewer tunnel. Id. at 462-63,
255 N.E.2d at 174-75, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 943-44. Similarly, in Rucker v. Andress, 38 App. Div.
2d 684, 327 N.Y.S.2d 91 (4th Dep't 1971), the rescuer found the victim approximately 15
minutes after the incident, and was injured in a rescue attempt some 30 minutes later. Id. at
685, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 92. In addition, in Prior Aviation Serv., Inc. v. State, 100 Misc. 2d 237,
418 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Ct. Cl. 1979), a period of 11 minutes passed between the stranding of
pleasure boat passengers and the subsequent helicopter rescue attempt and crash. Id. at
239, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 875. It appears that although there was a time lapse between the origi-
nal negligence and later rescue in each of these cases, the rescuer acted with dispatch upon
discovering the dangerous condition. See Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d
460, 462-63, 255 N.E.2d 173, 174-75, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943-44 (1969); Rucker v. Andress, 38
App. Div. 2d 684, 685, 327 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (4th Dep't 1971); Prior Aviation Serv., Inc. v.
State, 100 Misc. 2d 237, 238-39, 418 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Ct. Cl. 1979); cf. Parks v. Starks, 342
Mich. 443, 447-48, 70 N.W.2d 805, 806-07 (1955) (9-hour time difference between creation of
unsafe condition and plaintiff's attempt to protect children did not preclude application of
rescue doctrine). See generally supra note 256.
281 See 90 App. Div. 2d at 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 33. Although not expressly stated in the
facts of the case, the plaintiff presumably had a reasonable amount of time to consider the
ramifications of his kidney donation. Typically, potential organ donors undergo a period of
testing, and their informed consent must be obtained before a transplant operation may
proceed. See Guttman, supra note 262, at 975; Leavell, Legal Problems In Organ Trans-
plantation, 44 Miss. L.J. 865, 868 (1973); Woodside, supra note 262, at 71-72. Thus, in
Moore, as in Sirianni, the nonpatient donor did not act in one continuous sequence from
the point at which he learned of his father's peril, but rather, by necessity, there was a
prolonged intervening period during which a knowledgeable decision to donate was reached.
See Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553, 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County
1967); see also Trott v. Dean Witter & Co., 438 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 578
F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978) (rescue doctrine not applicable when there were several months to
consider the "best course of action").
282 Brief for Appellant at 3, 13, Moore v. Smith, 90 App. Div. 2d 389, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33
(3d Dep't 1982); see supra note 263.
282 See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969). In Tobin, the Court of Appeals refused to recognize a mother's cause of action for
psychic injuries which she allegedly suffered after seeing her injured child shortly after an
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although concededly a foreseeable plaintiff,"4 does not lie within
the requisite "zone of danger,' 285 as the court recognized,288 and to
permit recovery under such circumstances seemingly would be to
create a new cause of action,28 7 a matter more properly left to the
legislature.88
Victoria D. Salhus
automobile accident. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The Tobin Court
observed that although a parent's subsequent presence at the scene of such an accident
undoubtedly is foreseeable, the inability to place rational limits on foreseeable third parties
who might be entitled to recover renders the asserted cause of action undesirable. See id. at
615, 249 N.E.2d 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. The Court thus ruled that only those who are
directly injured by the defendant should have a cause of action. Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at
424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562. This still represents the view of a majority of jurisdictions. See
Note, The Negligent Infliction Of Mental Distress: The Scope Of Duty And Foreseeability
Of Injury, 57 N.D.L. REv. 577, 581 (1981); Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Keeping Dillon In Bounds, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1980); Comment, Portee v.
Jaffee: Dillon Comes to New Jersey, 33 RUTGERs L. REv. 1171, 1173 (1981). But see Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968).
90 App. Div. 2d at 390, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34; see supra note 262.
285 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). The Pal-
sgraf Court stated that "[t]he risk to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or others within the range of apprehension." Id.
288 90 App. Div. 2d at 391, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
287 New York courts have been reluctant to recognize new causes of action in the negli-
gence area. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363, 365 (1977) (parents have no cause of action for psychic injuries incurred as a result of
watching their child suffer from a degenerative disease); Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 88 App.
Div. 2d 785, 785, 451 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (4th Dep't 1982) (dentist's emotional injuries suf-
fered as a result of patient's death held not actionable); Albala v. City of New York, 78 App.
Div. 2d 389, 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786,
445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) (no cause of action permitted for preconception tort); Bessette v.
St. Peter's Hosp., 51 App. Div. 2d 286, 288, 381 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (3d Dep't 1976) (no
recovery allowed to wife who witnessed her husband's leg amputation); Sirianni v. Anna, 55
Misc. 2d 553, 557, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1967) (no cause of action
exists for voluntary organ donor).
28 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
902 (1978); Albala v. City of New York, 78 App. Div. 2d 389, 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981); Sirianni v. Anna, 55
Misc. 2d 553, 556-57, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1967).
